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ARTICLE
TITLE VI DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS WOULD
NOT HARM NATIONAL SECURITYA RESPONSE TO PAUL TAYLOR
MICHAEL

T.

KIRKPATRICK* & MARGARET

B. KwoKA**

As Paul Taylor recognizes in the previous issue of this volume of the
HarvardJournalon Legislation, Congress is consideringamendments to Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to explicitly allow private plaintiffs to use the
disparate impact theory to prove discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance. This Article responds to Taylor's assertion that allowing such
disparate impact claims could harm national security programs. The authors
explore the history of the disparate impact theory under both Title VI and Title
VII, explain that use of the theory is consistent with Congress'soriginal intent,
and argue that it should be restored through legislation. In particular,this Article shows how the lack of a disparate impact standard under Title VI has left the
victims of racialprofiling by airlines without effective relief and it explains why
allowing disparate impact claims would enhance nationalsecurity by subjecting
such practices to judicialscrutiny. Particularemphasis is given to the question
of the validity of racialprofiling and the wisdom of insulating the practicefrom
discriminationclaims. The Article concludes that allowingprivate disparate impact claims under Title VI would serve to better protect against discriminatory
policies and would not undermine national security.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin in any program or activity that receives federal financial assistance.' Currently, individuals who exercise their
private right of action under Title VI can establish liability only by proving

that they were the victims of intentional discrimination targeted at them as
individuals, known as disparate treatment discrimination. 2 In contrast, other
anti-discrimination laws allow plaintiffs to establish liability either by proving disparate treatment, or by demonstrating that the defendant has a policy
or practice that disproportionately affects a protected group if the defendant
fails to show that the policy or practice is necessary to achieve a legitimate
goal, known as disparate impact discrimination. This anomaly could be corrected by recently proposed legislation to amend Title VI to allow victims of
* Attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
Law Center. B.A. 1987, Texas Christian University; J.D. 1991, American University, Washington College of Law.
** Equal Justice Works Fellow, Public Citizen Litigation Group. A.B. 2002, Brown University; J.D. 2007, Northeastern University School of Law.
'Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4a (2006)).
2 See infra, Part II.
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discrimination in federally-funded programs to establish liability based on
disparate impact.'
In the previous issue of the HarvardJournal on Legislation, Paul Taylor argues that allowing private plaintiffs to bring disparate impact claims
under Title VI would undermine our national security by exposing recipients
of federal financial assistance to potential liability for racial profiling.4 According to Taylor, national security would be particularly threatened by allowing disparate impact claims in the context of airline passenger
screening.' Taylor's argument is fundamentally flawed. As described in detail below, allowing private disparate impact challenges under Title VI
would not only protect civil rights and promote racial equality, it would also
enhance security by eliminating programs and practices that are not empirically justified.
Part 11 of this Article will address the history of anti-discrimination
laws and describe how the disparate impact theory is necessary to fulfill
Congress's goal of eliminating discrimination. Part III will explain the need
to allow individuals affected by discriminatory practices to establish claims
based on disparate impact. Using recent cases, Part III will examine the
nearly insurmountable barriers to proving disparate treatment in the context
of post-9/l1 racial profiling by airlines, and the ways in which a case
brought under a disparate impact theory could help plaintiffs overcome those
hurdles. Part IV will explain how the "business necessity" 6 defense would
protect legitimate security programs from liability for disparate impact discrimination. It will also discuss the mistaken belief that there is a conflict
between security and civil rights, and expose why racial profiling is ineffective and counterproductive. This section will demonstrate that abandoning
the practice would enhance national security and advance racial equality.

II.

THE HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS

UNDER TITLES VI AND VII

Taylor begins his article with a short history of Title VII, 7 which prohibits discrimination in employment, as a prelude to his discussion of the pro-

' Proposed legislation to this effect was introduced in both houses of the 110th Congress.
See S.2554, 11 0th Cong. (2008); H.R. 5129, 11 0th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Proposed Legislation"]. The bills in both chambers were identical. Although
the proposed legislation has not yet been reintroduced in the 111 th Congress, when asked,
Senator Kennedy's (D-Mass.) office indicated that he intended to reintroduce the bill either in
this form, or perhaps as multiple smaller bills but similar in substance. Telephone Interview
with Charlotte Burrows, Counsel to Senator Kennedy (D-Mass.) (Mar. 26, 2009).
1 See generally Paul Taylor, The Risks Posed to NationalSecurity and Other Programs by
Proposals to Authorize Private Disparate Impact Claims Under Title VI, 46 HARV. J. ON
LEoIS. 57, 66-73 (2009).
5See id. at 69-72.
642 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2006).
7Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006)).
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posed legislation to allow private suits based on disparate impact' under
Title VI, which prohibits discrimination in programs that receive federal financial assistance. 9 Taylor errs, however, by asserting that Title VII was intended to bar only disparate treatment and thus was not meant to provide a
right of action based on disparate impact. To the contrary, "[t]he objective
of Congress in the enactment of Title VII... was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees."' 10
Indeed, the plain language of Title VII as originally enacted did not
prohibit only intentional discrimination; rather, it barred discrimination "because of' race or national origin." Accordingly, in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., the Supreme Court held that Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation."' 2 The Court recognized that "Congress directed the thrust of the
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."' 3 In its unanimous decision, the Court found that plaintiffs could establish liability under Title VII where an employment practice has a
disparate impact on a protected class of individuals, and the 1practice
is not
4
related to job performance or a matter of business necessity.
The standards that apply to disparate impact claims under Title VII
were further refined in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody15 and Dothard v.
Rawlinson.'6 In Albemarle PaperCo., the Supreme Court clarified the stan-

dard of proof for demonstrating that an employment practice with discriminatory effect is sufficiently job related to survive a disparate impact
challenge. 7 The Court held that assessing job relatedness is a highly factspecific inquiry. Thus, with respect to an employment test with a racially
discriminatory impact, the Court held that the employer must validate the
test in accordance with professional standards and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines.'

I See Taylor, supra note 4, at 59.
9 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4a (2006)).
'"Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).

1"Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
12 Griggs, 401
"3

U.S. at 431.

Id. at 432 (emphasis omitted).
1'See id. at 431 ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited.").
15422 U.S. 405 (1975).
16433

U.S. 321 (1977).

'"Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431, 435.
18 Id.
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In Dothard,women applicants challenged minimum height and weight
requirements that disproportionately excluded them from eligibility for employment as prison guards using the disparate impact theory.' 9 The Court
permitted the plaintiffs to establish disparate impact based on national statistics. 0 The Court then rejected the employer's argument that the height and
weight requirements were job related."' Although the employer argued that
the requirements were related to strength, the Court found that the employer
failed to produce evidence correlating the height and weight requirements
with the requisite amount of strength thought essential to good job performance as a prison guard. 2 Further, the Court held that even if a particular
amount of strength was required to do the job, the employer's "purpose
could be achieved by adopting and validating a test for applicants that measures strength directly," and "[sluch a test, fairly administered, would
fully satisfy the standards of Title VII because it would be one that 'measure(s) the person for the job and not the person in the abstract."' 24 These
decisions established that employers would need to produce specific evidence of job relatedness and business necessity to sustain the use of practices with a discriminatory effect.
Despite this history, in 1989, the Supreme Court significantly weakened
the disparate impact theory articulated in Griggs and refined in Albemarle
and Dothard. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 5 the Court shifted the
burden of proving business necessity away from the employer, and instead
required the employee to show that an employment practice is not justified
by business necessity. This decision stood in sharp contrast to the Griggs
standard, which required an employer to prove, as an affirmative defense to
a disparate impact claim, that the discriminatory practice was job related and
consistent with business necessity. 6 In response to Wards Cove Packing,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to reinstate the Griggs standard. 7 In legislatively overruling the Court, Congress stated a clear purpose:
"[T]he decision of the Supreme Court . . . has weakened the scope and
effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections[, and] legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in employment." 8 Congress's action to restore the disparate impact standard as it
'9

20
21

22
23

Dothard, 433 U.S. at 324.
Id. at 330-31.

id. at 331-32.
ld. at 331.

Id. at 332.

24 Id. at 332 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
25 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989).
26 See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 ("Once it is thus shown that the employment standards
are discriminatory in effect, the employer must meet 'the burden of showing that any given
requirement (has) . . . a manifest relationship to the employment in question.'") (quoting
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
27Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (1991)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)).
Isld. §2, 105 Stat. at 1071.
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existed prior to Wards Cove Packing reflects an understanding that Title VII
was intended to bar discriminatory employment practices regardless of the
29
employer's intent.

In 2005, the Supreme Court again had occasion to consider a statute
prohibiting discrimination "because of' a protected characteristic. In Smith

v. City of Jackson,3° the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),31 which contains a provision nearly identical
to that in Title VII, allows plaintiffs to establish liability for discrimination
using the disparate impact theory. The language of both acts prohibits employment actions that "deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such

individual's" race (Title VII) or age (ADEA). 32 Concluding that the ADEA,
like Title VII, encompasses disparate impact discrimination, the Supreme
Court began "with the premise that when Congress uses the same language
in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted
shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended
that text to have the same meaning in both statutes."33 The Court then reaf-

firmed that discrimination "because of' a protected characteristic "focuses
on the effects of the action on the employee rather than the motivation. .. of
the employer."' 4

Taylor's error in asserting that Title VII was designed to prohibit only
disparate treatment is based in part on his mistaken belief that disparate impact claims are incompatible with the legislative history.35 According to Taylor, the legislative history affirms that the Act does not require quotas or

statistical parity in the workplace, and thus he concludes that it was not
intended to prohibit disparate impact discrimination.36 Although Taylor is

correct that Title VII does not require racially proportionate results,37 he errs
by assuming that a prohibition on disparate impact discrimination will force
employers to adopt some form of quota system. First, a showing that a given
29 See infra note 127. Wards Cove Packing was decided on June 5, 1989. The 1991
amendments to Title VII restored the disparate impact standard "as it existed on June 4,
1989[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(C). See also 137 CONG. REc. 28,680 (1991) for the interpretive memorandum referenced in section 2000e-2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
states in relevant part that "[t]he terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to
reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989)."
30 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
"' Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(a)(2), 81 Stat.
602, 603 (1967) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2006)).
32 Id.; Smith, 544 U.S. at 235-36.
33Smith, 544 U.S. at 233.
34 Id. at 236.
31See Taylor, supra note 4, at 59-62.
36 Id. at 60.
31See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) ("[T]he Act does not
command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.").
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workforce is not racially balanced is insufficient, by itself, to establish a
prima facie claim of discrimination based on disparate impact. 8 Rather, a
Title VII plaintiff must "demonstrate[ ] that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact."3 9 This requirement
presents a far higher hurdle than simply asserting numerical inequality.4 The
requirement that a plaintiff identify the particular practice responsible for the
disparate impact protects against the risk that employers will move toward a
quota system to avoid liability and refutes the notion that liability might
attach as a result of a failure to use quotas. In fact, "the use of quotas by
public employers subject to Title VII can violate the Constitution."'4' Second,
achieving racial balance in a workforce will not insulate an employer from
liability if it uses discriminatory practices. 42 Thus, contrary to Taylor's premise, the disparate impact theory of discrimination does not conflict with
legislative and judicial concern about quotas nor does it require racially proportionate results.
Finally, and most importantly, an employment practice that has a disparate impact on a protected group violates Title VII only if the employer
"fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. '43 Any discriminatory practice that is necessary to serve the employer's legitimate goals will
survive a disparate impact challenge. 4 Put another way, if necessary qualifications are not equally distributed among the population in the community
from which employees are hired, statistical parity will not be reflected in the
workforce, but such an imbalance will not establish a violation of Title VII.
Thus, the Supreme Court does "not believe that disparate impact theory need
'45
have any chilling effect on legitimate business practices.
Like Title VII, the plain language of Title VI does not appear to limit its
reach to cases based on disparate treatment. Section 601 of Title VI reads:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na38 In contrast, in the disparate treatment context such a showing, if unexplained, may provide evidence of intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977) ("Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful
discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired.").
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2006).
0See generally Linda Lye, Title Vii's Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. Eu'. & LAB. L. 315 (1998);
Ian Ayres, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce
Hiring Quotas, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1487 (1996).
4'Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988).
42 See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (holding that the use of a discriminatory employment practice that cannot be justified as job related and consistent with business
necessity violates Title VH even where there is statistical parity in employment outcomes).
4342 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
"4Seeid.
45Watson, 487 U.S. at 993.
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tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. '46 In addition, Section 602 provides agencies the
47
authority to promulgate implementing regulations.
In an early case interpreting Title VI, Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme
Court "squarely held . . . that Title VI forbids the use of federal funds not
only in programs that intentionally discriminate on racial grounds but also in
those endeavors that have a disparate impact on racial minorities. ' 4 In Lau,
the Court cited Senator Hubert Humphrey's (D-Minn.) floor statement from
the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, during which he quoted President Kennedy: "Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages,
entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination." 49
Thereafter, a muddle of Title VI jurisprudence led to two important
decisions breaking from the Court's earlier decision in Lau: first, that the
statutory language of Title VI did not, in fact, prohibit disparate impact discrimination, 0 and then, that agencies, by their implementing regulations,
could not provide a private right of action to people who suffered disparate
impact discrimination.5 The former holding was reached in 1983 in a splintered decision in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission."
There, the Court decided that Lau had been effectively overruled by Regents
of the University of Californiav. Bakke, because of broad language in Bakke
stating that Title VI was "absolutely coextensive" with the Constitution,53
54
which prohibits only intentional discrimination.
Notably, two of the nine members of the Court disagreed with the conclusion that Lau was overruled and continued to believe that Title VI encompassed disparate impact claims.55 Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion,
46 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d to d-4a (2006)).
47 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006)).
48 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 589 (1983) (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)).
4 Lau, 414 U.S. at 569 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6543 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey (quoting President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil
Rights and Job Opportunities, I PUB. PAPERS 483, 492 (1963)))).
'o See Guardians,463 U.S. at 612.
"' See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2000).
52 463 U.S. at 582 (affirming the lower court 5-4).
" Id. at 614 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
' See id. at 589 (majority opinion) (discussing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976)).
" Those opposing the majority view noted that although the language of Bakke was broad,
"the issue in Bakke ... was whether Title VI forbids intentional discrimination in the form of
affirmative action intended to remedy past discrimination, even though such affirmative action
is permitted by the Constitution," Id. at 590 (majority opinion), and that the language at issue
in Bakke was "clearly superfluous to the decision in that case." Id. at 624 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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compiled an extensive legislative history demonstrating that disparate impact claims under Title VI are not inconsistent with Congressional intent.
First, Justice Marshall noted that immediately following the enactment of
Title VI, agencies promulgated implementing regulations that adopted dispa-

rate impact theories, including recommended regulations from a presidential
task force and the Justice Department (which helped to draft Title VI).56
Thereafter, "every Cabinet department and about forty federal agencies
adopted standards interpreting Title VI to bar programs with a discriminatory impact."57 Justice Marshall went on to recount that not only had Congress failed to alter this interpretation of Title VI, but it had in fact rejected

affirmative proposals that would have required a showing of intentional discrimination to make out a claim. 8 Finally, Justice Marshall explained that
Congress had, up until that time, enacted ten statutes modeled on Title VI
without requiring proof of intent in a discrimination claim. 9
Although this rationale did not prevail in Guardians,the legislative history (as summarized by Justice Marshall) casts serious doubt as to whether
congressional intent is being fulfilled under the current interpretation of Title
VI.6° Notably, in Guardians,five members of the Court agreed that regula-

tions adopted pursuant to Title VI could still prohibit disparate impact discrimination. 61 The right of agencies to make and enforce Title VI regulations

prohibiting disparate impact discrimination and providing a cause of action
to private parties aggrieved by such discrimination remained undisturbed for
the next two decades.

In 2001, the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandova 62 announced a major change in Title VI litigation. For almost forty years, private
citizens aggrieved by discriminatory federally-funded programs had brought
suits based on disparate impact under a variety of agency regulations. 63 In
Sandoval, the Court took as decided that Title VI itself did not prohibit proId. at 618 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
IId. at 619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 620 & n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing 112 CONG. REc. 18715 (1966)). The
proposed legislation would have added a requirement under Title VI that a plaintiff show
"affirmative intent to exclude." Id. at 620 n.8 (citing 112 CONG. Rac. 18,701 (1966)).
'9Id. at 620 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' See id. at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61 Those justices included the two who would have found that Title VI itself prohibits
disparate impact policies (White & Marshall, JJ.), and three who did not (Brennan, Blackmun,
& Stevens, JJ.). See id. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). However, arguably only two of the
justices in Alexander v.Sandoval concluded that a private right of action existed under such
regulations, while three opined that there was no occasion to reach that question. 532 U.S. 275,
283 (2001) (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 645 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). But see Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 300-01 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority misreads footnote eighteen of his dissent in Guardians).
62 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
63 See generally Derek W. Black, The ContradictionBetween Equal Protection'sMeaning
and Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 533, 538-39 (2006) (explaining that it was common to pair an Equal Protection claim
with a Title VI disparate impact claim when it was unclear how the discrimination came about,
and thus, that until 2001, the Equal Protection Clause's narrow construction was not fully felt).
56
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grams with a disparate impact, 64 and that as to disparate treatment, Title VI
did provide a private right of action. 65 Moreover, the Court assumed, without

deciding, that Section 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination were valid. 66 However, using the congressional intent standard 67 for
determining whether a private right of action exists in a statute, the Court
found that regulations proscribing disparate impact-which it found not prohibited by Title VI itself-cannot support a private right of action. 6s The

Court held that a private right of action is not available for "a failure to
comply with regulations promulgated under § 602 [(authorizing agency regulations)] that is not also a failure to comply with § 601 [(directly prohibiting intentional discrimination by federally funded programs)] ....,69
The dissent in Sandoval clarifies that this result was hardly a foregone

conclusion. Justice Stevens described the majority opinion as "unfounded in
our precedent and hostile to decades of settled expectations," and pointed
out that every court of appeals to consider the question prior to 2001 had
decided that agencies could provide a private right of action for disparate

impact claims. 70 "The question the Court answers today," Justice7 1 Stevens

stated, "was only an open question in the most technical sense."
Just as legislation was necessary to override Supreme Court decisions
that had weakened Title VII, Congress should amend Title VI to explicitly

allow a private right of action for claims of discrimination based on disparate impact. As explained below, such legislation is necessary to eliminate

discrimination in federally-funded programs in circumstances where the disparate treatment theory is inadequate to establish liability. As with Title VII,
procedural and substantive protections in the proposed legislation amending
Title VI guard against the defensive use of quotas by recipients of federal

funding. The proposed legislation itself states that the "legal standard for a
disparate impact claim has never been structured so that a finding of discrimination could be based on numerical imbalance alone. '72 Specifically, as
4Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-81 ("Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination." (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985))).
65 Id. at 279-80 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (deciding that Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 has a private right of action based on the fact that
Title VI has one)).
66Id. at 281-82. However, the Court did call into question whether that assumption was
correct: "Though no opinion of this Court has held that [regulations promulgated under § 602
of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups,] five
Justices in Guardians voiced that view of the law at least as alternative grounds for their
decisions. These statements are in considerable tension with the rule of Bakke and Guardians
Id. at 281-82 (citations omitted).
I..."
that § 601 forbids only intentional discrimination .
67 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
6 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289.
6d.
I at 286. For a discussion of how to reconcile some of the apparent gaps in reasoning
of this analysis, see John Arthur Laufer, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implicationsfor Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2002).
70 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 294, 295 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7'Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Proposed Legislation, supra note 2, § 101(6).
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with the disparate impact standard codified in Title VII, the proposed legislation provides that a Title VI plaintiff must link any numerical discrepancy to
an identifiable policy or practice to establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact.73 Moreover, as with the business necessity defense under Title VII,
the proposed legislation provides a defense for any program that can be
shown to be necessary to serve a legitimate goal.7 4 The proposed legislation
would repair the judicially-created oddity that currently excludes disparate
impact claims from the reach of Title VI, although those claims are available
under many other civil rights laws.
III.

ALLOWING DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE
NECESSARY TO END DISCRIMINATION BY RECIPIENTS

VI

IS

OF FEDERAL FUNDS

In the Title VHI context, "[t]he 'disparate impact' theory adopted in
Griggs paved the way for massive improvement in the occupational position
of minorities and women."75 Congress should extend the gains made in the
employment context by allowing liability for disparate impact discrimination
in programs funded by the federal government.
Indeed, Congress itself noted, when it reinstated the Griggs test, that
"the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) ha[d] weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal
civil rights protections. 7 6 Similarly, the proposed legislation reinstating a
private right of action for disparate impact claims under Title VI notes that
"Alexander v. Sandoval . . . 'significantly impairs statutory protections
against discrimination ... by stripping victims of discrimination ... of the
right to bring action in Federal court to redress [it].' "7 The bill also states
that the decision "contradicts settled expectations created by title [sic] VI
...[which was adopted] to ensure that Federal dollars would not be used to
subsidize or support programs or activities that discriminated on racial,
71Under the proposed legislation, an aggrieved person must demonstrate that "a policy or
practice .. .causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, or national origin." Id. at
§ 102(b)(1)(A)(i). Moreover, the bill provides that each specific policy must, on its own, cause
a disparate impact, and that if it is demonstrated that the policy does not cause the impact,
liability does not attach. Id. at § 102(b)(1)(B)(i) ("With respect to demonstrating that a particular policy or practice causes a disparate impact.., the aggrieved person shall demonstrate that
each particular challenged policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the aggrieved person demonstrates to the court that the elements of a covered entity's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be
analyzed as I policy or practice."); id. at § 102(b)(1)(B)(ii) ("If the covered entity demonstrates that a specific policy or practice does not cause the disparate impact, the covered entity
shall not be required to demonstrate that such policy or practice is necessary to achieve the
goals74of its program or activity.").
See infra Part IV.
3Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments,
7 6 63 CHI.-KErNr L. REV. I, 3 (1987).
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991).
77S. 2554, 110th Cong. § 101(l) (2008); H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. § 101(l) (2008).
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color, or national origin grounds."7 Moreover, eliminating discrimination
depends in large part on the use of private lawsuits to enforce federal civil
rights law.7 9
Over time, the disparate impact theory has become ever more essential
to enforcement of prohibitions on discrimination, because discrimination has
become more subtle and harder to prove. "In an era that is characterized by
the widespread, explicit adoption of nonracist, egalitarian ideals and the general decline of old-fashioned, overt racial bigotry, fewer individuals than in
the past are likely to be motivated by discriminatory animus." 0 Even when
the motive exists, plaintiffs encounter problems of proof. As Justice Marshall wrote in a concurring opinion to the Supreme Court's most important
decision concerning racial discrimination in jury selection: "Any prosecutor
can easily assert facially [race-]neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial
courts are ill equipped [sic] to second-guess those reasons."'"
Although the proposed amendments to Title VI would apply to a broad
range of programs that receive federal financial assistance, Taylor focuses on
what he sees as a threat to the use of racial profiling in airline passenger
screening if private suits based on disparate impact are allowed. 2 As explained in Part IV below, Taylor's analysis is flawed because any legitimate
and effective practice will withstand a disparate impact challenge. Taylor's
focus on airline passenger screening is useful, however, because victims of
post-9/11 racial profiling by airlines have been unable to secure relief using
the disparate treatment theory, even in egregious cases of discrimination.
This difficulty demonstrates the need to allow disparate impact claims under
Title VI to remedy the systemic problem of racial profiling in aviation. As
explained below, if the disparate impact theory were available to victims of
racial profiling, the airlines would have to demonstrate that the practice is
effective or be held liable for discrimination.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, there was a surge in
discrimination by airlines and airport screeners against passengers perceived
to be of Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent. Within one month of
the attacks, the New York Times reported the use of the phrase "flying while
brown" to refer to "reports of Muslim-Americans being asked to get off
planes." 3 Between 2001 and 2009, the Department of Transportation

78

S. 2554, 10th Cong. § 101(2) (2008); H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. § 101(2) (2008).

79For a comprehensive discussion of the benefits of private enforcement over agency en-

forcement, including incentives for private parties and agency resource constraints, see Mark
A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 167

(1985).
8 Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 1013, 1017 (2004).
s'Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
82 Taylor, supra note 4, at 90-93.
13 Somini Sengupta, Sept. 11 Attack Narrows the Racial Divide, N.Y. TMEms, Oct. 10,
2001, at BI.
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("DOT") received 1022 complaints of discrimination against U.S. airlines, 4
and the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") received 1080 civil
rights complaints about its personnel.85
As further evidence of widespread discrimination, DOT's Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings brought administrative enforcement actions against four major air carriers alleging that each had engaged in a
pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination against passengers perceived
to be of Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent by either removing
them from flights or denying them boarding. 6 Each enforcement action was
resolved by the entry of a consent order requiring the airlines to make additional expenditures to provide their employees with civil rights training. 7
Arab and Muslim civil rights organizations have also documented
widespread discrimination since 9/11. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Research Institute issued a report on hate crimes and discrimination against Arab Americans from 2003-2007, in which the
Committee concluded that "[d]iscrimination at airports based on stereotyping, over-zelousness [sic] or prejudice by airline personnel or even other
passengers is now one of the main sources of discrimination facing ArabAmerican air travelers."88 In an earlier report, covering only the first year
after 9/11, the Committee documented eighty instances of passengers being
removed from airplanes based on their perceived ethnicities.89 Often, the real

See Spencer S. Hsu & Sholnn Freeman, JetBlue, TSA Workers Settle in T-Shirt Case,

WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2009, at A2. See also OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., AVIATION CONSUMER REPORTS (2009), available at http://aircon-

sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/index.htm (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
8"See Hsu & Freeman, supra note 84.
86See Am. Airlines, Inc., No. OST-2003-15046 (Dep't of Trans. Feb. 27, 2004) (Consent
Order), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main =Docket
Detail&d=DOT-OST-2003-15046; Delta Airlines, Inc., No. OST-2004-16943 (Dep't of Trans.
June 21, 2004) (Consent Order), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=Document/Detail&o=090000648031aaea; Cont'l Airlines, Inc., No. OST2004-16943 (Dep't of Trans. Apr. 2, 2004) (Consent Order), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main =DocumentDetail&o=090000648031 aade;
United Air Lines, Inc., No. OST-2003-14194 (Dep't of Trans. Nov. 19, 2003) (Consent Order),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail
&o=090000648030df3f (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
87 See Am. Airlines, Inc., No. OST-2003-15046 (Dep't of Trans. Feb. 27, 2004) (Consent
Order), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main =Docket
Detail&d=DOT-OST-2003-15046; Delta Airlines, Inc., No. OST-2004-16943 (Dep't of Trans.
June 21, 2004) (Consent Order), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=Document/Detail&o=090000648031aaea; Cont'l Airlines, Inc., No. OST2004-16943 (Dep't of Trans. Apr. 2, 2004) (Consent Order), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main =DocumentDetail&o = 09000064803 1aade;
United Air Lines, Inc., No. OST-2003-14194 (Dep't of Trans. Nov. 19, 2003) (Consent Order),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/componentlmain?main=DocumentDetail
&o=090000648030df3f (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
88 AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM. RESEARCH INST., 2003-2007 REPORT ON
HATE CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB AMERICANS 3 (2008), available at http:II

www.adc.org/PDF/hcr07.pdf (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
89
AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM.

RESEARCH INST., REPORT ON HATE CRIMES

AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB AMERICANS: THE POST-SEPTEMBER
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son given to the passenger was that the crew did not "feel" comfortable
allowing that individual on-board. 90 Reports of discrimination were made

against virtually every major airline. 91 Indeed, discrimination against Muslim
airline passengers is so common that the Council on American-Islamic Rela-

tions ("CAIR") publishes a piece entitled "Know Your Rights as an Airline
Passenger" as part of an American Muslim Civic Pocket Guide.92
Despite numerous incidents of post-9/l 1 racial profiling by airlines, no
victim of such discrimination has yet prevailed in a private action using the
disparate treatment theory. For example, in June 2002, the ACLU filed five
separate civil rights lawsuits accusing American, Continental, Northwest,
and United airlines of intentional discrimination against five men who were
ejected from flights based on the perception that they were Arab or Muslim.93 None of these cases made it to trial.
In Sader v. American Airlines, Inc.,g4 an American citizen of Moroccan
descent was removed from a flight because another passenger was "not

comfortable" having him on board.95 Although the passenger's case survived
an initial motion to dismiss, the case was settled on undisclosed terms

shortly after the airline filed its motion for summary judgment. 96 Similarly,
in Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc.," an American citizen of Arab descent was
removed from a flight because members of the crew "felt uncomfortable"
having him on board.9" The case was settled pursuant to an agreement requiring civil rights training for airline personnel and a modest monetary award. 99
In Chowdhury v. Northwest Airlines Corp., a passenger of Bangladeshi ancestry filed suit because he "was denied boarding on a Northwest Airlines
. ..flight even after Northwest, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
airport security had determined that he did not pose a security risk.' 1l The
11, 2001--OCrOBER 11, 2002 7 (2003), available at http://www.adc.org/hatecrimes/
pdf/2003_report-web.pdf (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
9See id. at 22.
9'See id. at 22-29.
92
TEMBER

COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, KNOW YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AS AN AIR-

(2009), available at http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/KnowYourRights.aspx
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
93See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU, ADC and Relman Law Firm Sue Four Major Airlines
Over Discrimination Against Passengers (June 4, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/
racialjustice/racialprofiling/ 15868prs 20020604.html (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
94Complaint, Sader v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-1892 (D. Md. filed June 4, 2002).
91Id. at 3.
96 Sader v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-1892 (D. Md. Sept. 10, 2002) (memorandum and
order denying motion to dismiss); Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Sader v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., No. 02-1892 (D. Md. Nov. 12, 2002); Sader v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-1892
(D. Md. Nov. 19, 2002) (order dismissing due to settlement).
9'Complaint, Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 02-04368 (C.D. Cal. filed June 4, 2002).
LINE PASSENGER

98

Id. at 3.

99Settlement Agreement attached as Exhibit A to Motion to Settle, Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc., Adv. Pro. No. 04-2414 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. filed Mar. 4, 2005) (following transfer to
Bankruptcy Court).
""i Chowdhury v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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district court denied Northwest's motion to dismiss, 0' but the case has been
administratively closed °2 following a bankruptcy stay and pending the resolution of collateral litigation over documents withheld from discovery. 03 Finally, in Dasrath v. ContinentalAirlines, Inc., the ACLU represented two'0°
of three men removed from a flight after a passenger reported that "three
brown-skinned men" were "behaving suspiciously."'' 05 Although Dasrath
survived Continental's motion to dismiss, 0 the court later granted Continental's motion for summary judgment, finding that "when the circumstances
are viewed in their entirety, a jury would be compelled to find that security
considerations were the sole reason" for Dasrath's removal, even though
Dasrath had not engaged in suspicious behavior. 107 Each of these cases demonstrates the nearly insurmountable barriers faced by victims of racial profiling in aviation when seeking relief under the disparate treatment theory.
Cerqueira v. American Airlines, Inc.108 was the first case challenging
post-9/l 1 racial profiling by an airline that made it to trial. John D. Cerqueira, an American citizen of Portuguese descent who is often mistakenly
perceived to be Middle Eastern, 0 9 sued American Airlines after the airline
removed him from a flight and refused to rebook him even after the police
cleared him for travel.
Cerqueira had been seated next to two men who also had a Middle
Eastern appearance, but Cerqueira did not know them or interact with them
in any way." l0 Cerqueira and the two men seated next to him, but no other
passengers, were removed from the plane by the Massachusetts State Police."' After two hours of questioning, all three men were cleared for travel
but American Airlines refused to rebook them on any other flight." 2 Cerqueira alleged that, by removing him from his flight and refusing to rebook
him after he was cleared by the police, American Airlines twice discrimi'01 Id.at 1158.
102 Chowdhury v. Northwest Airlines Corp., No. 02-02665 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2005) (order
closing case).
03 After the district court recognized an evidentiary privilege allowing Northwest to withhold from discovery certain information that the Transportation Security Administration had
designated as "sensitive security information," Chowdhury v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 226
F.R.D. 608 (N.D. Cal. 2004), Chowdhury filed a petition for review of the TSA's non-disclosure determination. Petition for Review, Chowdhury v. TSA, No. 03-40783 (2d Cir. filed Oct.
24, 2003). The Second Circuit heard argument on May 23, 2005, but no decision has been
issued.
"o,Dasrath v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 531, 533-34 (D.N.J. 2002). The
two plaintiffs, Edgardo Cureg and Michael Dasrath, filed separate suits that were later joined.

Id.

1oId. at 536.
10Id. at 531.

'o Dasrath v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 431, 446 (D.N.J. 2006).
'o 520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008).
"09Joint Appendix at 257, 281, Cerqueira, 520 F.3d 1 (lst. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1824)
(hereinafter App.).
I'Old. at 258-59.
Id11d.
at 259-60, 310.
2
11
Id. at 262, 382, 443.
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nated against him because of his perceived race or ethnicity. The airline
claimed that its treatment of Cerqueira was justified by security concerns. I3
The case was tried to a jury under the disparate treatment theory. Cerqueira presented direct evidence of discrimination by lower-level employees
who influenced the decisions, and circumstantial evidence of discrimination
by the formal decisionmakers. The district court instructed the jury that it
was Cerqueira's burden to prove that he was intentionally discriminated
against because of his perceived race or ethnicity, and the district court emphasized that airlines are not liable for denial-of-service decisions based on
safety. 14 The jury rejected as pretext American Airlines's proffered explanations and concluded that, but for Cerqueira's Middle Eastern appearance, the
airline would not have removed him from his flight or refused him further
service." 5
On appeal, the First Circuit vacated the jury verdict and ordered that
judgment be entered for American." 6 The First Circuit rested its decision on
three conclusions of law. First, the court of appeals found that the district
court erred by relying on the doctrine of respondeat superior because it "permitted liability of the air carrier to turn on the purported bias of non-decisionmakers."" 7 According to the First Circuit, an air carrier cannot be liable
for decisions that are driven by the discriminatory animus of subordinates;
rather, to result in liability the removal decision would have to be based only
on the formal decisionmaker's own bias.I" Second, the First Circuit held that
circumstantial evidence cannot be used to prove discrimination in an airline
refusal-to-transport case because the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

113The pilot testified that he ordered Cerqueira's removal based on a flight attendant's

assertions that Cerqueira: (1) requested a seat change in an insistent manner; (2) might have
boarded early; and (3) used the lavatory. App., supra note 109, at 295, 300, 363. But the flight
attendant admitted nothing she reported to the pilot about Cerqueira ordinarily results in removal and denial of service. Id. at 366-70. The pilot claimed that he removed the other two

passengers because: (1) one of them had a conversation with the pilot that the pilot considered
odd; (2) a flight attendant reported that they had wished other passengers a "happy new year"
and were heard "speaking in a different language"; and (3) another flight attendant reported
that they joked with her during the exit row briefing. It was undisputed that Cerqueira did not
engage in any of these behaviors, and there was nothing that linked Cerqueira to these two
men except his Middle Eastern appearance. Further, the flight attendants' trial testimony, and
written reports from the day of the incident, showed that the flight attendants became concerned about the exit row passengers because of the flight attendants' perception that the three
passengers were from the Middle East. See id. at 372, 376-79, 428-36, 452-54. The decision
not to rebook Cerqueira on any American Airlines flight was made by American's system
operations manager who testified that, although he made the decision to deny rebooking, he
has no recollection of the reasons for his decision. An entry in Cerqueira's computerized Passenger Name Record notes that Cerqueira was denied boarding due to unspecified "security
issues" and that Cerqueira should not be rebooked on American. See id. at 321-23, 423.
"4 App., supra note 109, at 394, 412.
"' See id. at 212.
116 Cerqueira, 520
7
1 Id. at 18.

F.3d 1.

181Id. at 19.
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framework" 9 was developed in cases involving employment discrimination. 20 Finally, the First Circuit concluded that the statutory discretion to
refuse to transport a passenger for safety reasons, granted to airlines in 49
U.S.C. § 44902(b),' 2' creates a conflict between safety and civil rights, and
122
that the former must be prioritized over the latter.
The most striking feature of the First Circuit's decision is its conclusion
that there is a conflict between safety and civil rights and that statutes
prohibiting discrimination against airline passengers are subordinate to an
airline's permissive refusal rights under § 44902(b). Although the First Circuit correctly recognized that § 44902(b) does not protect refusal-to-transport decisions that are arbitrary or capricious,'2 3 it rejected the district court's
conclusion that a jury verdict based on a finding of intentional discrimination on account of race necessarily satisfies the arbitrary or capricious standard. 24 By rejecting the principle that decisions driven by racial stereotypes
are unreasonable, the First Circuit's decision condones the use of racial profiling in airline denial-of-service decisions. Indeed, the First Circuit's original slip opinion stated explicitly that "[r]ace or ethnic origin of a passenger
may, depending on context, be relevant information in the total mix of infor'19A plaintiff can prove employment discrimination using indirect evidence under the
burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-804 (1973), and refined in Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination. Establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption of
unlawful discrimination, and the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged act. If the defendant fails to carry
its burden, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the defendant meets its
burden of production, the plaintiff must prove that the reasons proffered by the defendant are a
pretext for discrimination. The burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
20
See Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 18.
121 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006) provides: "Subject to regulations of the Under Secretary,
an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier may refuse to transport a passenger or
property the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to safety."
122 See Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 16.
23 Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 14 ("We agree with Williams and hold that an air carrier's

decisions to refuse transport under § 44902(b) are not subject to liability unless the decision is
arbitrary or capricious." (citing Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir.
1975) (interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 151 l(a), the predecessor to § 44902(b)))).
124Id. at 17. Several other district courts had reached the same conclusion as the district
court in Cerqueira.See Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 984, 1004 (D. Minn.
2007) ("[A] refusal to board a passenger that is motivated by a passenger's race is inherently
arbitrary and capricious."); Dasrath v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434
(D.N.J. 2006) ("A decision based on race would be arbitrary and capricious."); Alshrafi v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 150, 162 (D. Mass. 2004) ("[A]ctions motivated by racial
or religious animus are necessarily arbitrary and capricious, and therefore beyond the scope of
the discretion granted by Section 44902."); Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d
1198, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding "no merit" to airline's argument that civil rights laws
conflict with § 44902(b) and holding that § 44902(b) "does not grant [the airline] a license to
discriminate"); Chowdhury v. Northwest Airlines, Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1154 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) ("[T]here is no apparent conflict between the federal statutes prohibiting racial
discrimination and the federal law giving air carriers the discretion to refuse to carry passengers for safety reasons.").
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mation raising concerns that transport of a passenger 'might be' inimical to
safety."125 The First Circuit later issued an Errata Sheet that eliminated this
statement, 26 but the court's conclusion that racial profiling is a legitimate
security measure remains implicit in its amended opinion. Thus, the First
Circuit's decision in Cerqueira protects airline denial-of-service decisions
that are based on stereotypes about the propensity of passengers with a Middle Eastern appearance to commit acts of terrorism.
The lack of any successful disparate treatment challenges to racial profiling by airlines demonstrates the need to amend Title VI to allow private
disparate impact suits. In Cerqueira,the court of appeals entered judgment
for the airline notwithstanding the jury's conclusion that Cerqueira's perceived race drove the decisions at issue, because the court concluded that
there is a conflict between security and civil rights. That conclusion rested
on an assumption that racial profiling enhances aviation safety. But that assumption was not tested at trial; indeed, the airline claimed that it had not
engaged in racial profiling at all, but had made its decisions based solely on
the behavior of the removed passengers. Had Cerqueira been able to proceed
under a disparate impact theory, once he established a prima facie case' 27 the
burden would have shifted to the airline to prove, as an affirmative defense,
that racial profiling is necessary to serve the goal of aviation safety. 2 8 Thus,
allowing disparate impact claims would put the efficacy of racial profiling
on trial. As explained in Part IV below, subjecting racial profiling to disparate impact challenge would not threaten the practice if its efficacy can be
proved, and, if the practice cannot be defended, its elimination will serve the
interests of both security and civil rights.
IV.

PRIVATE DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS WOULD NOT THREATEN

LEGITIMATE SECURITY PROGRAMS, BUT WOULD ENHANCE SECURITY AND
CIVIL RIGHTS BY ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES

THAT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED

Under the proposed amendments to Title VI, any policy implemented
by a recipient of federal funding would result in liability only if the policy
125 Cerqueira

v. Am. Airlines, No. 07-1824, slip op. at 38 (1st Cir. Jan. 10, 2008).

126Errata Sheet at 3, Cerqueira, No. 07-1824 (Feb. 29, 2008).
17 Airlines facing disparate treatment challenges to denial-of-service decisions typically
deny that they engage in racial profiling and instead claim that they took action because the
passenger's behavior was suspicious or the passenger's presence made others uncomfortable. In
such cases, the plaintiff would establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that
the policy or practice of removing passengers based on assertions of suspicious behavior or
causing other passengers discomfort disproportionately burdens passengers perceived to be of
Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent.
'28
Defendants would have an incentive to defend disparate impact challenges rather than
try to refute disparate treatment allegations, because only equitable relief is available to prevailing plaintiffs in disparate impact cases. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 602. Thus, an entity
found liable under the disparate impact theory will not be subject to compensatory or punitive
damages.
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causes a disparate impact on a protected group and the recipient "fails to
demonstrate that the challenged policy or practice is related to and necessary
to achieve the nondiscriminatory goals of the program .... -"I2 Taylor argues
that the lack of a specific national security liability exemption, as is found in
Title VII, poses a risk to necessary national security programs. 30 However,
under the proposed amendment, Title VI would include a clear defense to
31
liability for programs related to and necessary to achieve legitimate goals.'
3
2
National security is a legitimate goa' and any programs truly necessary for
national security will therefore survive a disparate impact challenge. No additional national security exemption is necessary to protect valuable security
programs.
Taylor is correct that the "related to and necessary to achieve" provision is analogous to Title VII's business necessity test. 133 However, courts do
not construe the business necessity test as strictly as Taylor suggests. 134 Notably, the Supreme Court-in applying the Griggs business necessity standard-has in many instances upheld the legality of employment practices
that cause a disparate impact. For instance, in Washington v. Davis, applicants for entry-level police officer positions in Washington, D.C. challenged
a written test of verbal ability used in hiring. 13 The Court concluded that
evidence of a relationship between higher scores on the test and success in
the training course-even without evidence of a relationship between high
scores and performance as a police officer-was sufficient to satisfy the
business necessity test. 3 6 The Court declared: "It is also apparent to us...
that some minimum verbal and communicative skill would be very useful, if
not essential, to satisfactory progress in the training regimen."' 37
Similarly, in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, employees

challenged a policy barring employment of people taking methadone, including those who were taking methadone as part of a drug treatment program.'s The plaintiffs relied on substantial evidence that many participants
in a methadone maintenance program were capable of performing a variety
of jobs with the employer, and that the policy disproportionately affected
members of minority racial groups."'
129 S. 2554,

110th Cong. § 102(a)(2) (2008); H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. § 102(a)(2) (2008).
'30 See Taylor, supra note 4, at 58-59.
'31 See Proposed Legislation, supra note 2, at § 102(b)(1)(A)(i).
132See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). Although parts of Korematsu have been overturned or called into question since the opinion was issued, the proposition that national security is a legitimate state interest has never been questioned.
133See Taylor, supra note 4, at 65.
34
' See id. at 61.
135426 U.S. 229, 233 (1976). This case also firmly established that, although disparate
impact claims could proceed under Title VII, as to state employers only intentional discrimination was actionable as a Constitutional violation. See id. at 239-42.
136Id.
37

1

13

Id.

at 250.

440 U.S. 568, 577 (1979).

139Id. at 578-79.
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court questioned the validity of the statistical evidence showing a disproportionate impact, and then concluded that
"[the employer's] legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency require the exclusion of all users of illegal narcotics, barbiturates, and amphetamines, and a majority of all methadone users."' 4° As Justice Blackmun
wrote, "what constitutes a business necessity . . . necessarily involves a
case-specific judgment which must take into account the nature of the particular business and job in question."' 4 1 Indeed, both the Supreme Court and
lower courts have had no trouble applying the Title VII business necessity
test to permit employers to use many practices that may have had a disparate
impact on a protected class of individuals, but nevertheless are needed to
serve a legitimate non-discriminatory goal.
Although Taylor cites cases that were decided under the Title VII national security exemption, he does not offer any reason why those same policies would not have been upheld under the business necessity defense
instead. 42 Taylor assumes that the Title VII national security exemption adds
protection for employers, but in fact, it duplicates protection that is already
provided by the business necessity defense. 43 Any program that is necessary
to advance a legitimate interest will survive a disparate impact challenge,
44
and courts have repeatedly engaged in this type of careful line-drawing.
If a program does not advance legitimate goals, we are better off discarding it. First, any program that lacks a legitimate goal, and which disproportionately burdens a minority group, may be motivated by discriminatory
animus or a manifestation of latent or systemic prejudice. Such programs
must be eliminated to serve our nation's expressed commitment to racial
equality. 45 Second, ineffective programs waste resources and divert attention from more effective alternatives. Thus, the elimination of discriminatory
programs found to be illegitimate will help to enhance the legitimate goals

140Id. at

585-87 n.31.

141Watson

v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1005 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
142 See Taylor, supra note 4, at 63.
143 Of course, if the programs at issue in the cases relying upon the national security
exemption were not in fact necessary to national security, challenges to those programs may
have been helpful to national security by weeding out ineffective and discriminatory programs,
as discussed infra Part IV.
1'4 One scholar, advancing a proposal for courts to engage in a cost-benefit analysis when
deciding about the legality of racial profiling, points out that the Supreme Court has already
drawn lines in different circumstances between legal and illegal profiling in the immigration
context. See Mariano-Florentino Cu~llar, Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin
and Race, 6 H~Av. LATINo L. Rav. 9, 30 (2003). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976) (being of apparent Mexican ancestry alone is sufficient to subject an
individual stopped at a permanent inland immigration checkpoint to increased level of search
and questioning); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (race as one of multiple factors supports reasonable suspicion of being undocumented and permitting immigration
police to stop and question an individual).
145 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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of the recipients of federal financial assistance by increasing the overall pool
of available resources.
As an example of a program that he considers to be unduly threatened
by a disparate impact challenge, Taylor cites the post-9/1 1 Department of
Justice program that authorized thousands of interviews with immigrants
based on their country of origin and other factors. 46 The program targeted
immigrants from predominantly Arab and Muslim countries, supposedly because these are the countries in which AI-Qaeda has a presence. 47 If such
targeting were necessary to achieve a legitimate national security goal, the
program would survive a disparate impact challenge. But, as David Cole
suggests in his book Enemy Aliens, the program did not target individuals
from countries with known ties to Al-Qaeda that were not predominantly
Muslim or Arab, such as countries in Europe. 148 Thus, perhaps the goal of
finding individuals with Al-Qaeda connections could actually be better accomplished by a less discriminatory method. A disparate impact challenge
may encourage the government to consider whether a program's first response was really the best policy for security or equality. 149
Taylor also defends the racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims as a
means of thwarting terrorist attacks. 150 As explained below, profiling on the
basis of race, religion, or national origin has tremendous social cost and
lacks value as a law enforcement tool. Taylor's concern that such programs
might not survive a disparate impact challenge belies the problem: such programs are indefensible with empirical evidence,' 5' since otherwise they
would not be threatened by the proposed addition of a private right of action
under Title VI for claims based on disparate impact. And, as stated before,
eliminating ineffective programs increases the availability of resources to
programs that work. Thus, the elimination of ineffective and damaging racial
profiling programs by means of disparate impact challenges would promote
both civil rights and security.
Before discussing its defensibility, it is important to understand the
types of practices that fall within the term racial profiling.' Most commonly, racial profiling refers to treating an individual differently based upon
the belief that members of that person's racial or ethnic group are more

146Taylor, supra note 4, at 67 & n.45.
141See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 49 (New Press 2003).
148 Id.

149See Curllar, supra note 144, at 10 ("law enforcement policies appear to be shaped
more by political demands and whether they seem useful, rather than by a sustained, reasoned
inquiry into whether such policies actually are useful." (emphasis in original)). Curllar also
suggests increased judicial review for racial profiling practices than currently exists under
constitutional law as a result of this empirical problem. Id.
" Taylor, supra note 4, at 69-72.
"I'See discussion of empirical support for racial profiling, infra Part IV.
112This is hardly a settled question. See generally Deborah Ramirez et al., DefiningRacial
Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 Am. CrIM. L. REV. 1195 (2003).
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likely to commit the type of crime being investigated.'53 The term racial profiling is not typically used to describe an investigation of a particular crime

where a victim or witness has identified the race of the perpetrator, and the
police consider race in decisions about which suspects to question or otherwise investigate. 1 4 Thus, courts have sanctioned the use of race in investiga55
even
tions where race is part of a description of a particular suspect,'
56
though the Supreme Court has rejected racial stereotyping.

Investigations of future conduct, such as plots to commit crimes, can
also take account of race without being considered racial profiling if conducted in a targeted way. Deborah Ramirez has a particularly nuanced examination of the meaning of racial profiling in a post-9/l1 context. 5 7 She
identifies two instances when race should legitimately be considered in a
criminal investigation without falling under the rubric of profiling:

1. For a limited time and within a particular vicinity, police are
investigating a specific crime committed by a specific person
and race or nationality is part of a multi-variable description

containing particular readily identifiable and distinctive factors,
characteristics or behavior beyond race, ethnicity, or national
origin;
2. For a limited period of time and at a specific location, using
concrete evidence linking race to a specific, particular criminal
3 See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice's 2003 Guidelines, 50 Lov. L. REV. 67, 79 (2004) (citing Samuel R. Gross & Debra
Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002)).
154See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 147.
'55 See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337-38 (2d Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between permissible use of race to identify suspect based on witness description and unlawful profiling based on racial stereotype); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 353 (6th
Cir. 1997) (holding that "the Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from police action, including the decision to interview an airport patron, based solely on impermissible racial considerations"); Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 468 n.8 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
detention of airport patron was not racial discrimination under § 1981 because she matched the
racial description of the person described in a tip, but noting that its "conclusion would be
very different if the officers, acting without a tip, focused their investigation on Buffkins solely
because of her race," as opposed to using race as an investigative factor following a tip, or as
one of several factors). That is not to say, of course, that this use of race cannot be abused as
well. In Brown, the Second Circuit upheld a finding that police did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause by questioning every African American in the town where a crime was
allegedly committed by a black man with a cut on his hand. 221 F.3d at 334, 337-8. This
decision, widely viewed as problematic (even by the court that made it), shows how difficult it
can be to draw a line between the legitimate use of race even in the context of a suspect
identification. See Brown, 235 F.3d at 769 (petition for rehearing en banc denied, with lengthy
dissents from the denial). Taylor cites this decision for the proposition that race can be constitutionally used to investigate a particular crime, Taylor, supra note 4, 73 n.68; we add only that
as a matter of effectiveness, it is important to note that no perpetrator was found as a result of
this practice. See Brown, 221 F.3d at 334.
156See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991) (prohibiting racial stereotyping in civil jury selection); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1986)
(prohibiting racial stereotyping in criminal jury selection).
117See generally Ramirez, supra note 152.
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incident, police use race, ethnicity, or national origin as part of
58
a multivariable description.
At least one congressional proposal has also drawn a distinction between profiling and targeted investigation. The proposed End Racial Profiling Act, which otherwise includes a very broad definition of racial profiling,
still provides an exception for the legitimate use of race when there is "trustworthy information, relevant to the locality and timeframe, that links a person of a particular race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion to an identified
criminal incident or scheme."' 5 9
Thus, because considerations of race, when part of a specific, limited
search for the perpetrator of an identifiable past or future crime, are not
understood to be racial profiling, there is no cause for concern that a ban on
racial profiling will force officers to ignore known facts about the race of
specific sought-out perpetrators.
As to profiling, rather than investigation, the survival of the practice
under a disparate impact challenge would depend upon the specific facts of
each case. Each profiling challenge would be evaluated to determine if the
use of race in that context is related to and necessary to achieve the nondiscriminatory goals of the program. For example, the goals of protecting our
national security and preventing terrorist attacks certainly qualify as legitimate nondiscriminatory purposes.l 6 In most cases, however, a program that
employs racial profiling to meet those goals will likely fail to qualify as
"related to and necessary to achieve" those goals. The reason is simple:
racial profiling has not been shown to effectively advance law enforcement
goals or national security.
There are several reasons why racial profiling is ineffective. First, it is
empirically unsuccessful. The most commonly studied racial profiling context is the practice of pretextual traffic stops, where the true reason for the
stop is not the minor traffic violation, but that the driver is black.' 6' This
practice exists despite the fact that "no data demonstrates [sic] either a gen-

158Id. See also David A. Harris, New Risks, New Tactics: An Assessment of the Re-Assessment of Racial Profiling in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 913, 926
(2004) ("[P]rofiling's purpose is prediction.").
159End Racial Profiling Act of 2005, S. 2138, 109th Cong. § 3(6) (2005).
"6Indeed, even under the strict scrutiny test used to determine the constitutionality of
facially race-based laws, national security has been held to be a compelling governmental
interest. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
6I Pretextual traffic stops are so common that they are commonly known as the phenomenon "DWB," or "driving while black." DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 36 (1999). One
Florida study showed that although "5 percent of drivers on [a] highway were dark-skinned,
nearly 70 percent of those stopped were black or Hispanic, and more than 80 percent of cars
searched were driven by blacks and Hispanics." Id. at 37; see also Harris, New Risks, New
Tactics, supra note 158, at 925. This practice has been facilitated by the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Whren v. United States, 516 U.S. 806 (1996), where the court held that as long as
an officer observes a traffic violation, there is no Fourth Amendment violation for stopping a
vehicle even if the true motivation for the stop was race.
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eral or a circumstantial correlation between race and crime. ' 162 Although
there are data showing correlations between arrest rates and race, and incarceration rates and race, these statistics reflect any and all accumulated bias
directing investigations toward black men and other people of color. 63 With
regard to drug enforcement-one of the most common purposes for pretextual stops-the fraction of instances that illicit substances are found (known
as the "hit rate") does not vary by race; only the police investigation rate
varies by race. 64 Thus, the same percentage of African Americans subject to
drug searches was found to have drugs in their possession as the percentage
of whites subjected to drug searches. But, of course, the percentage of African Americans searched was greater than their representative proportion of
165
the population.
In fact, when the U.S. Customs enforcement agency changed its procedures on searches to exclude race and refocused officers on observational
techniques and behavioral characteristics, the overall rate of successful
searches improved.166 Using race as a proxy for potential criminality "moves
. ..officers away from what counts-what people under observation are
doing-to a factor with little or no predictive value: what people look
67
like."'
The numerical success rate of racial stereotyping does not improve in
the terrorism context, where profiling tends to target individuals who appear
to be Arab or Muslim. First, there are an estimated six million Muslims in
the United States, 168 and well over a million individuals who identify as having an Arab ancestry. 69 Thus, identifying a person as Muslim or Arab does
not meaningfully narrow the field. 170 Moreover, Muslims and Arabs do not
share one readily identifiable appearance even within each of these groups,
much less between them. Of the total number of Muslims living in the
United States, only twenty-six percent are Arab; thirty-four percent are
South Asian and twenty-five percent are African American.' Indeed, peo-

162Ramirez et al., supra note 152, at 1211.
163See id.
" Deborah Ramirez cites several studies, including one in Maryland where twenty-eight
percent of black people subject to search and twenty-eight percent of white people subject to
search were carrying contraband. Id. Data from New Jersey, North Carolina, California, and
U.S. Customs all supported this conclusion. See id. at 1212. In fact, many studies suggest that
Latinos
are less likely to be carrying contraband than whites. See id. at 1213.
65
1 See id. at 1211.
'66See id. at 1213.
167Harris, supra note 158, at 927.
168See Andrea Elliott, Between Black and Immigrant Muslims, an Uneasy Alliance, N.Y.
TtIMs, Mar. 11, 2007, at A30.
169 The 2000 Census reported 1.2 million people as having reported an Arab ancestry. See
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE ARAB POPULATION: 2000 (2000), http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/c2kbr-23.pdf (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
170Ramirez et al., supra note 152, at 1216. ("[T]he more potential suspects who match
the general description, the less valuable the information becomes.").
171See Elliott, supra note 168, at A30.
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pie from places as diverse as Portugal 17 2 and India 73 have been subject to
racial targeting because of the mistaken perception that they were Arab or
Muslim.
Furthermore, many of the most notorious terrorists in recent history do
not have a physical appearance that reflects traditional stereotypes of Arabs
or Muslims, and thus would not fit any racial description one might decide
to use to target either of these populations. The most oft-cited examples of
terrorism in the United States, apart from 9/11, include the bombing of the
74
federal building in Oklahoma City (perpetrators were white Americans),
the shoe bomber (perpetrator's mother was British and father was Jamai176
can), 17 the unibomber Ted Kaczynski (white American from Chicago),
and Bruce Edwards Ivans, who ultimately committed suicide upon being
investigated as a suspect in the post-9/1 1 anthrax attacks (white American
from Ohio).177 Indeed, not even all members of Al-Qaeda are Arab in appearance; for instance, John Walker Lindh (white American from Maryland)
was convicted for activities assisting the Taliban and is known to have been
7
involved with Al-Qaeda.1 1
Apart from problems of accurately identifying Arab or Muslim individuals, racial profiling is also ineffective because a terrorist organization can
easily defeat it by using operatives who do not meet the expected racial
profile. As one scholar questions, "what are the constraints on terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda in selecting individuals of different races or ethnicities to carry out terrorist attacks, especially if these groups know in advance
what inspectors and investigators are looking for to some degree?"'

79

The

answer is clear: "It would be surprising if Al Qaeda, which has shown an
ability to adjust to efforts to destroy its organization, would not be sufficiently flexible to arm persons who do not meet our profiles."' 80
Some suggest that even behavioral profiling may be easily defeated by
terrorists using probes to determine what characteristics are likely to result in
enhanced scrutiny. For example, a system of behavioral profiling called the
Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System ("CAPPS") has been in
172See Margaret Kwoka, The Return of Legalized Racial Profiling, Z MAC., June 2008, at

7.

'73 See Ramirez et al., supra note 152, at 1225 (Indian-American motorist with his two
daughters stopped by Maryland State Trooper who believed they were Arab and asked for
proof74that they were from India).
1 See Johnson, supra note 153, at 176.
175 See id.
76
1 See Robert D. McFadden, Prisonerof Rage-A Special Report: From a Child of Promise to the Unabom Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1996, at Al.
177See Obituary: Dr. Bruce Edwards Ivans, FREDERICK NEWS POST, July 31, 2008, available at http://www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/local/obit-detail.htm?obitlD=24497 (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
78
'
See CNN.com, John Walker Lindh: Profile, http://www.cnn.conCNN/Programspeople/shows/walker/profile.html (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
171 Cuflar, supra note 144, at 20-21.
"8David Rudovsky, Racial Profiling and the War on Terror, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNumbra 173, 176 (2007).
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place in the United States since 1999.18 But in a 2002 study, two computer

science graduate students from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
("MIT") mathematically proved that using random searches would be more
effective. 8 2 Although the parameters of CAPPS are classified, passengers
know when they have been selected for secondary screening.'83 The MIT
scientists show how terrorists can use testers to determine who does not
meet the profile, and they conclude that random searches are statistically
more likely to be effective because terrorists cannot practice against the system.1 Thus, whatever the alternative-behavioral profiling or random
searches or some other system of screening-moving away from racial profiling increases the effectiveness of law enforcement investigations.
Further, racial profiling is not only ineffective, it may actually be
counterproductive. Profiling that targets a community with a certain religious, ethnic or racial heritage can alienate that community from law enforcement and discourage cooperation with investigations.' 85 David Cole
explains: "This is not to suggest that otherwise law-abiding individuals will
knowingly protect and hide terrorists, but that the kind of routine information and connections that are so critical to identifying active criminals and
terrorists will be significantly less forthcoming."' 86 In addition, post-9/11
measures taken by the U.S. government have been viewed not only within
the Arab American community, but rather all around the world, as being
"focused solely on Muslims and Muslim countries," "a war against Muslims," and "a new kind of racial profiling which the U.S. Government applies but denies."' 87 One front page article in the Washington Post in 2002
88
featured Saudis "who once considered America their second home."'
Nonetheless, the article reports, "the suspicion and sometimes hostility directed at [their] people since Sept. 11, 2001, have left [them] embittered
toward a country [they] once admired."' 8 9
Paul Butler's article in the criminal context, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the CriminalJustice System, is evidence of the power
'8See Samidh Chakrabati & Aaron Strauss, CarnivalBooth: An Algorithm for Defeating
the Computer-AssistedPassengerScreening System, May 16, 2002, http://groups.csail.mit.edu/
mac/classes/6.805/student-papers/springO2-papers/caps.htm (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
182Id.
183See

id.
"' See id.
185 Deborah Ramirez asserts that the use of race in law enforcement "engenders tremendous frustration, anger, and hostility from communities of color" and that "when the community is not invested in the justice system, law enforcement has more difficulty tapping into the
community as a resource for invaluable intelligence information." Ramirez et al., supra note
152, at 1214-15.

186 COLE,

ENEMY ALtENS,

supra note 147, at 190.

"I Id. at 195 (quoting articles appearing in London's Guardian, Cairo's Middle East
Times, and Pakistan's News).
188Peter Baker, 'I'll Never Go Back': Saudis Who Once Embraced America Now Feeling
Embittered
and Betrayed, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2002, at A01.
89
1

Id.
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this disaffection may have on a targeted community. 9 In this article, Butler
presents a moral basis for black jurors to vote to acquit a black defendant of
certain nonviolent crimes that the juror believes the defendant did in fact
commit.' 91 Butler's argument is based on the greater harm to the community
that would result from that defendant's incarceration than resulted from the
crime itself. 92 Even to advance this argument is a powerful testament to the
depth of injury to the integrity of our justice system that can come from
marginalizing a part of our own community through race-based policing.
There is evidence that this type of community blocking 93 actually does
arise from community dissatisfaction. David Cole lists anecdotes of black
juries acquitting black defendants despite strong evidence of guilt. 94 Attorney General Eric Holder has observed that, in his estimation, at least ten
cases over which he presided as a trial judge ended in hung juries as a result
of a holdout juror who was unwilling to send another young black man to
jail for a nonviolent crime. 95 Statistics also show that juries made up
predominantly of black and Hispanic jurors acquit minority defendants at a
far higher frequency than predominantly white juries. 96 Moreover, black
witnesses to a crime involving a black defendant are often reluctant to come
forward.

197

If a similar disaffection has not already been bred among members of
the Arab and Muslim communities, 9 s we certainly risk that outcome by the
continued adoption of ineffective policies that disproportionately burden
these communities. First, Arabs and Muslims have long been the target of
discrimination; it is not unique to a post-9/1 1 United States. For example, in
1987 eight students in Los Angeles associated with a group called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine were arrested in raids, detained as
national security risks, and put through deportation proceedings. 99 Though
the government admitted that none had actually engaged in any criminal

'90 Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1996).
'9' See generally id.
192Id. Other prominent legal academics viscerally recognize the problem of racial profiling. Harvard Law School Professor Charles Ogletree once put it simply: "If I'm dressed in a
knit cap and hooded jacket, I'm probable cause." COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 147, at 47.
'9' Community blocking may be defined as communities becoming more hesitant to engage with authorities.
"' See COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 161, at 169-70.
195See id.
'96 See id. at 170 (Cole reports that in the Bronx, for instance, juries acquit black defendants in felony cases at a rate of 47.6%, as compared to a national average of 17%).
" See id. at 169.
'98 Indeed, some suggest that not only has such disaffection already been bred, but also
that racial profiling and Arab and Muslim targeting for mistreatment has resulted in actual
violence and further terrorism. See Ruth Singer, Race Ipsa? Racial Profiling, Terrorism and
the Future, 1 DEPAUL J. Soc. JUST. 293, 312 (2008) (citing the example of the July 7, 2005
London bombers, at least one of whom did not fit the profile of a Muslim fundamentalist, but
referenced the mistreatment of other Arabs in his suicide video).
' See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 148, at 162.
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activity, they were subject to deportation under a now-repealed anti-Communist law that targeted association with various organizations. 2°° Although
successfully defended in immigration proceedings, "the case took on legendary proportions among Arab Americans, cast a chilling pall over their political advocacy, and raised deep suspicions about the fairness of the
government's actions. ' ' 20 Indeed, most of the political activists targeted by
20 2
this exclusion law during the 1980s and 1990s were Arabs and Muslims.
Specific incidents relating to the airline industry have also provoked
outrage in the Arab and Muslim communities. In one striking incident, TSA
and JetBlue workers refused to let an Iraqi-born U.S. resident board until he
covered up the writing on his T-shirt, which was in Arabic.0 3 On another
occasion in Minneapolis, six imams were removed from a U.S. Airways
flight, resulting in the airline's apology for the incident and a subsequent
lawsuit . 2° In Seattle, an Iranian-born software developer who worked for
American Airlines was kicked off of an American Airlines flight by the pilot. 05 In a particularly ironic turn of events, officers at Logan airport detained the coordinator of the American Civil Liberties 06
Union's Campaign
Against Racial Profiling, who is black and has a beard.
These types of outrages continue to this day. In early 2009, AirTran
removed nine Muslim American passengers from a flight and refused to
rebook them on a later flight.20 7 This case, eerily similar to Cerqueria v.
American Airlines, prompted a complaint to the Department of Transporta20 8
tion filed by the Council on American-Islamic Relations.
Cases such as these have already led the Arab and Muslim communities
to fear and distrust law enforcement. They are "subjected to delays, humiliation and periodic roughing up while getting through the United States airports." 2°9 As a result, some Arab Americans and Muslim Americans now
avoid airports, even to pick up passengers, "for fear of a nasty encounter

20 See id. at 163; McCarren-Walter Act of 1952,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6)(D), (F), (G), (H) (1988) (repealed). See generally Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing the case and anti-Communist statute).
20,COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 147, at 168.
202See id. at 192.
203See Spencer S. Hsu & Sholnn Freeman, JetBlue, TSA Workers Settle in T-Shirt Case,

WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2009, at A02.
204See David Hanners, Imams Asking for 10 Years of Airline Bias Complaints: U.S. Airways Balks, Citing 9/11 Impact, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 15, 2008, at B2.
20"See Racial Profiling Allegations Abound in Post-9/Jl World, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 15,

2007, at 5.
206 See David Abel, ACLU CoordinatorWrongly Held, Jury Rules: Racial Profiling at
Logan Alleged, BosToN GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2007, at B2.
207 See Amy Gardner & Spencer S. Hsu, Airline Apologizes for Booting 9 Muslims, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2009, at A01.

See id.

208

Neil MacFarquhar, U.S. Muslims Say Terror FearsHamper Their Right To Travel, N.Y.
Tn Es, June 1, 2006, at A].
209
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with a law-enforcement officer."210 These experiences will not lead to increased cooperation with law enforcement officials, open lines of communication between law enforcement and Arab Americans, or generally
encourage the perception of legitimacy in our law enforcement system. On
the contrary, these incidents may actually hinder security efforts.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, racial profiling and 9/11 must be
viewed in a historical context. Just prior to 9/11, racial profiling was widely
condemned on all sides of the political spectrum.2 ' President George W.
Bush, addressing Congress just months before the attacks, declared that he
was asking the Attorney General for recommendations to end racial profiling, because "[i]t's wrong ..... [B]y stopping the abuses of a few, we will

add to the public confidence our police officers earn and deserve." 12
It was only after 9/11 that public opinion shifted.213 One Gallup poll
reported that "forty nine percent of Americans would support a practice of
Arabs and Arab-Americans, United States citizens or not, being forced to
carry a special identification card; fifty-eight percent would support requiring Arabs to undergo more security checks at airports."2 14 The events of 9/

11, however, should not change our otherwise accepted legal, moral, and
practical decision that racial profiling is unacceptable. As the Second Circuit
recently stated, "[t]he strength of our system of constitutional rights derives
from the steadfast protection of those rights in both normal and unusual
times."215
Other "unusual" times in history when we have disregarded or placed
on hold our constitutional rights to be free from racial discrimination have
proven the necessity of those protections, not the need for exceptions to
them. The most notable example is the Japanese internment during World
War II. In Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court infamously upheld
this racially discriminatory internment as a result of the purported national

210

Id.

21 See Harris, supra note 158, at 913 (citing a 1999 Gallup poll in which eighty-one
percent disapproved of the practice of racial profiling). In an apt description of the practice of
racial profiling in the context of "reasonable suspicion" Terry-stops, Justice Thurgood Marshall once stated that "the basis of the decision to single out particular passengers during a
suspicionless sweep is less likely to be inarticulablethan unspeakable." Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 441 n.l (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212 147 CONG. REC. 2,347 (2001) (address of President George W. Bush to the Joint Session of Congress).
213 See R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and the War on Terror, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 173,
175 (2007) ("Many people who condemned racial profiling in the War on Drugs were now
convinced that it would be an effective tool in the War on Terror."); Harris, supra note 158, at
914 ("Post September 11, polling again showed a strong consensus about racial profiling, but
one that was 180 degrees different than it had been before."); Singer, supra note 198, at 299.
24 Ramirez et al., supra note 152, at 1225 (citing Morning Edition: Reactions People are
Having to Suddenly Being Suspicious of Anyone Who is Muslim or Arab (NPR radio broadcast
Sept. 20, 2001)).
215Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, No. 07-1015, 2009 WL 1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (including the right to be free
from racial discrimination among those rights not to be suspended in unusual times).
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security interest

1 6 Since

then, however, a 1995 Supreme Court decision de-

nounced the decision, 2 7 and Justice Scalia has placed Korematsu on par with
Dred Scott."' Politicians have vowed such a program will never be imple-

mented again, and the public views that policy as a stain on American history. 21 9 It is also worth noting that "the Japanese internment ...found zero
220
terrorists or spies.

While racial profiling in an airport is not equivalent to the drastic measure of indefinite internment in camps, it is naYve to think that targeting an
ethnic group on the basis of its race will remain a comparatively minor inconvenience. The L.A. Times reported that in 2002, then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft crafted a plan that "would allow him to order the indefinite

incarceration of U.S. citizens and summarily strip them of their constitutional rights and access to the courts by declaring them enemy combatants. '22' On July 19, 2002, in a U.S. Civil Rights Commission hearing,
Bush-appointee Commissioner Peter Kirsanow opined that if another attack
in the U.S. occurred, "and they come from the same ethnic group that attacked the World Trade Center, you can forget about civil rights. '22 Even
more disturbing, he raised the possibility of mass detention of Arab Ameri-

cans in camps as a legitimate response if another attack should occur. 223 This
prompted the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee to call for his
removal from the Commission. 224 Not only was he not removed, but he was
appointed to the National Labor Relations Board thereafter in January,
2006.225

Thus, 9/11 prompted policies perhaps different in degree but not in kind
from Japanese internment. 226 As Taylor notes, the prevailing view after 9/11
was that although race and ethnicity should play no part in so-called normal
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995).
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219 In the 1980s Congress paid reparations to victims of the internments. See COLE,
216
227
218

ENEMY

supra note 147, at 98; see also id. at 99 (asserting that "[w]hile Korematsu itself has
not been overruled, it is widely viewed with shame").
22' Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to Internment: Special Registration and Other Human
ALIENS,

Rights Violations of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, 29 VT. L. REV. 407, 417 (2005).
221 Johnathan Turley, Campsfor Citizens: Ashcroft's Hellish Vision, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2005, at B 11.
222 Press Release, Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., ADC Update: ADC Calls for
the Removal of U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner (July 20, 2002), available at http://www.bintj
beil.comladc/020720_kirsanow.html (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
223 See id.
224 See id.
225 See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights-Commissioner Kirsanow, http://www.usccr.
gov/cos/bio/kirsanow.htm (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
2216
See Taylor, supra note 4, at 68-69 (discussing Department of Justice guidance to this
effect). After 9/11, the Department of Justice instituted a policy of using immigration policing
to identify Arab and Muslim foreign nationals in the country, resulting in the detention in
segregated facilities of over seven hundred Arab and Muslim men based on immutable characteristics and not based on individualized suspicion. See Banks, supra note 213, at 175. Banks
details many other programs that targeted men identified as Arab or Muslim. Id.
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law enforcement, that absolute prohibition should not apply in the context of
national security and terrorism, where the consequences may be so much
greater. 227 This rationale leads one to wonder, however, whether and how a
practice which has been widely deemed ineffective in the normal law enforcement context, suddenly becomes effective in the fight against terrorism.
Perhaps for all these reasons, a government-wide memo written by five
intelligence experts distributed after 9/11 cautioned against racial profiling
and recommended law enforcement focus on behavior to advance better security. 228 One of the authors, in an anonymous interview, went so far as to
say that the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks was caused, at least in part, by
"paying attention to a set of characteristics, instead of a set of behaviors that
launch an attack. ' 229 The memo opined that profiling "draws an investigator's attention toward too many innocent people, and away from too many
230
dangerous ones.
As this memo predicted, racial profiling targeting Muslims and Arabs
has been going on since 9/11 and has turned up very little useful evidence of
national security threats. As part of a registration program requiring foreigners from most Arab and Muslim countries to submit periodic information,
almost 3000 people were detained in the first few months, and none were
ever charged with terrorism.' In the winter of 2002, the Justice Department
conducted interviews with 5000 immigrant men based primarily on their
Arab and/or Muslim countries of origin. 232 Further, one report from the Office of the Inspector General revealed that in 738 immigration detentions of
foreign nationals of interest in terrorism investigations, not a single one was
ever charged with a terrorism-related crime. 233 Despite these and other programs targeting people specifically because of their Arab and/or Muslim
heritage, the U.S. government has not destroyed A1-Qaeda, found Osama bin
Laden, or held anyone accountable in court for playing a substantial role in
the attacks of 9/11.234
Because credible evidence does not support the notion that racial profiling is advancing our national security, allowing private rights of action
under Title VI will improve our security systems by eliminating ineffective
programs that consume resources and distract law enforcement from achieving its goals. All of us will benefit from greater scrutiny of the effectiveness

227Taylor, supra note 4, at 71-72 n. 65. See Cudllar, supra note 144, at 13 (noting that

many proponents of racial profiling cite the idea that "[t]errorism's consequences appear far
more22devastating
than the threat posed by narcotics trafficking or any other traditional crime").
8
See Bill Dedman, Memo Warns Against Use of Profiling As Defense, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 12, 2001, at A27.
229 Id.
230 Id. (summarizing the memo).
231'See COLE, ENEMY ALiENs, supra note 147, at 50.
232See id. at 49.
233See
234 See

id. at 30.
generally page xx in the Forward to the new edition of COLE, Enemy Aliens.
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of our law enforcement programs, and from the increased equality of all
members of our society.
V.

Conclusion

In the conclusion to his article, Taylor notes that Title VI has broad
application.2 35 He argues that applying the disparate impact theory to Title VI
will result in judicial scrutiny of discriminatory practices in a wide variety of
activities and programs that receive federal financial assistance.23 6 That is, of
course, the intent of the proposed amendments to Title VI.237 But Taylor
argues that such a result is undesirable for several reasons, none of which
have merit.
First, Taylor asserts that some recipients of federal funding might abandon justifiable discriminatory practices rather than shoulder the burden of
defending those practices from disparate impact challenges.238 He believes
that abandoning such practices could have negative consequences. By way
of example, Taylor argues that fear of disparate impact suits may have
caused some mortgage lenders to stop using creditworthiness standards to
judge loan applicants, which, he says, may have been "a prime cause of the
current financial crisis because many loans were extended to people who
could not reasonably be expected to be able to pay them back. '239 But, even
if there were evidence that the weakening of underwriting standards was the
result of an effort to avoid disparate impact lawsuits, the resulting foreclosure crisis shows that the more stringent lending criteria could have been
successfully defended as "related to and necessary to achieve the nondiscriminatory goals of the program," that is, minimizing loan defaults. 24 Thus,
the negative consequences claimed by Taylor can arise only where the discriminatory policy or practice is necessary to serve a legitimate purposeand thus could be successfully defended-but the recipient of federal funds
chooses to abandon the practice rather than demonstrate its legitimacy.
Taylor next asserts that Supreme Court decisions requiring proof of discriminatory intent to establish constitutional claims are a "warning from the
Court" that statutes allowing disparate impact claims are ill-advised. 241 To
the contrary, conduct that does not violate the Constitution is often made
unlawful by statute, and the Court's opinions regarding constitutional claims
have no relevance to statutory disparate impact claims. Indeed, the Court has
never opined that disparate impact claims, where allowed by statute, are unconstitutional or ill-advised.
233 See generally Taylor, supra note
236 See generally id. at 90-105.
237
238
239
2
241

4, at 105-09.

See supra Part II.
Taylor, supra note 4, at 250.
Id.
H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. § 102(a)(1) (2008); S. 2554, 110th Cong. § 102(a)(1) (2008).
Taylor, supra note 4, at 251.
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Taylor's most fundamental opposition to the disparate impact theory
rests on his view that the courts are ill-equipped to determine whether a
discriminatory policy, particularly in the national security context, is necessary to serve a legitimate goal.2 42 He claims that "courts and judges.., have
no institutional expertise in national security programs[.] 2 43 But courts
often lack expertise in the subject matters that come before them, which is
why judges, as generalists, must rest their decisions on the evidence
presented. There is no reason to believe that the courts are ill-equipped to
handle tough decisions about the effectiveness of national security programs.
Any recipient of federal funds seeking to justify a discriminatory national
security program on the basis that it is necessary to serve a legitimate interest will have an opportunity to present expert witnesses, statistical studies,
and other evidence.
Moreover, courts show a heightened degree of deference to the judgments of the national security community when called upon to adjudicate
claims in that context. As the Supreme Court said in Department of Navy v.
Egan, "unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in
military and national security affairs." 244 In Egan, the Court applied this deferential approach to security clearance requirements,2 45 but this judicial standard is exhibited elsewhere as well.2 46 Whether or not there is an enumerated
exemption pertaining to review of national security decisions, as in Title VII,
or whether national security programs simply defeat a disparate impact
claim by making the requisite showing of necessity to serve a legitimate
interest, it is clear that courts are reluctant to overrule the opinions of national security experts or overturn the government's national security programs. Thus, the courts are not likely to substitute their judgment on matters
of national security for that of national security experts, and the threat that
Taylor identifies from the proposed legislation is an illusory one.
Similarly, the proposed legislation does not, as Taylor claims, present a
separation of powers problem.2 47 Indeed, the history of Titles VI and VII
shows that Congress intended to prohibit discrimination whether intentional
or not.2 41 When the courts strayed from the disparate impact approach with
respect to Title VII, Congress amended the statute to explicitly reflect its
242

Id. at 250 n.227.

243

Id.

244484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).
245 Id.
246 See,

e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (finding that provision of National Security Act was an Exemption 3 Statute for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act, thus
authorizing withholding of information); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982) ("For
aids entrusted with discretionary authority in such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance
of functions vital to the national interest.").
24 See Taylor, supra note 4, at 107-09.
248 See supra Part II.
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original intent. 49 Now again, courts have foreclosed the enforcement of Title
VI in a way that frustrates Congress's intent, and the proposed legislation
would remedy this problem. If anything, a failure to pass this legislation
would frustrate the purposes of Congress, not the other way around.250 The
proposed legislation contains sufficient standards to guide the judiciary in
determining whether a particular practice should survive a disparate impact
challenge, and amending Title VI to allow private disparate impact claims
would not grant the courts any extraordinary power over national security
programs.
Finally, Taylor concludes his argument with the same error he started
with. Taylor states that "[d]isparate impact claims, if authorized, would
greatly expand the power of courts and private litigants to invalidate programs that are neutral on their face, and not motivated by bias, on the
grounds that the results of such programs simply entail a disparate impact on
covered groups."2 51 What Taylor fails to mention is that such programs will
be found unlawful only if the defendant cannot justify the program by showing that it is necessary to achieve a legitimate goal.2" 2 If the proponent of the
program cannot make such a showing, there is no risk that the disparate
impact theory will hamper national security.253 Rather, private disparate im-

pact claims will serve the interests of justice by eliminating unnecessary
barriers to racial equality.

id.
id.
2' Taylor, supra note 4, at 252.
252See id. See also supra Part IV.
253 See supra Part IV.
249 See
250 See
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